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COMMENTS
INJUNCTIONS AGAINST OUT-OF-STATE DIVORCES:
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW YORK LAW
Each state has a legitimate interest in the marital status of its own domicil-
iaries. Its courts may restrain persons over whom it has in personam juris-
diction from instituting proceedings in foreign jurisdictions.' The purpose
of this comment is to examine the conditions under which New York will exer-
cise this equity jurisdiction to restrain a spouse from prosecuting a divorce
action in a foreign country or a sister state.
PRE-1940 PERIOD
As early as 1850 a New York court enjoined a resident spouse, attempting
to circumvent the laws of New York, from prosecuting a divorce action in a
sister state.2 The court reasoned that, even though New York would not
recognize the divorce, it would be inequitable to put the wife, who was also
a New York domiciliary, under the cloud of such a decree, or put her to the
expense of the litigation necessary to avoid it. Once established, the power
to enjoin a resident spouse was exercised liberally.3 It was said to be em-
ployed whenever the "usual" grounds for equitable interference existed. These
grounds came to include: (1) evasion of the laws of the common matrimonial
domicile; (2) fraud upon the foreign court; (3) hardship and inconvenience
in defending against the foreign action; (4) prejudice to the property rights
of the petitioning spouse; (5) subjection to the indignities of an unjustified
divorce; and (6) priority of jurisdiction by the enjoining state to determine
the same issues sought to he litigated in the foreign action. The courts in every
instance assumed that the sister-state divorce would be void in New York.
Consistent with the underlying logic of the cases cited, a New York court in
1926 enjoined a spouse seeking a Mexican "mail-order" divorce.4 The ob-
jection of the defendant, that an injunction was unnecessary, since his Mexican
decree, if obtained, would be void in New York, was rejected. Whether the
defendant sought a divorce based on sham domicile in a sister state or in a
foreign country made no difference so long as the defendant was a resident of
New York. It was said that the plaintiff should not be exposed to the doubt
as to her marital status which could be raised, should the other spouse contract
a second marriage which might have validity, at least in Mexico. She should
not, moreover, be put to the expense of a proceeding to invalidate the foreign
judgment.
It is plain that until 1940 New York dealt strictly with a fugitive from
1. 28 Am. Jur., Injunctions § 204 (1940); 19 CJ., Divorce § 263 (1920); Restatement,
Conflict of Laws § 96 (1934).
2. Forrest v. Forrest, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 1S0 (N.Y. 1350).
3. Greenberg v. Greenberg, 21S App. Div. 104, 213 N.Y. Supp. 87 (1st Dep't 1926);
Gwathmey v. Gwathmey, 116 Misc. 85, 190 N.Y. Supp. 199 (Sup. Ct. 1921), aff'd, 201
App. Div. S43, 193 N.Y. Supp. 935 (Ist Dep't 1922); Jeffe v. Jeffe, 163 i c. 123, 4
N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct. 193); Dublin v. Dublin, 150 Misc. 694, 270 N.Y. Supp. 22
(Sup. Ct. 1934).
4. Greenberg v. Greenberg, 213 App. Div. 104, 21S N.Y. Supp. 87 (1st Dep't 1926).
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matrimony looking for an easy foreign or sister-state divorce. Social dignity,
property interests, and enforcement of the laws of the matrimonial domicile
relating to marital responsibilities were but a few of the commanding incentives
for granting the injunction.
THE GOLDSTEIN CASE
This liberal view was, however, discountenanced in the controversial case
of Goldstein v. Goldstein.0 There the plaintiff-wife sought to restrain her
husband from prosecuting a Florida divorce. The allegations stated that both
parties were residents of New York, the state where the marriage had been
contracted; that both had lived there for the past twelve years; and specifically,
that the husband was not a resident of Florida. The court refused the in-
junction. It reasoned that the Florida court would be wholly without juris-
diction to render a valid divorce decree against the plaintiff. Plaintiff, there-
fore, had nothing to fear from the foreign action, since she could incur no
injury. Equity will not restrain conduct merely because it is offensive to one's
feelings or may cause mental anguish.0 Dissenting, Judge Conway argued
that since the foreign decree would allow the defendant to remarry, his second
wife's financial demands would jeopardize the amount of support which the
plaintiff might obtain. It would seem that in the Goldstein decision the court
abandoned the century of equitable considerations which the courts had ap-
plied under similar circumstances. The decision did not escape criticism.7
THE GARvIN CASE
Before 1942, in assuming that sister-state decrees would be void, New York
courts relied on Haddock v. Haddock,8 which was then accepted law. In the
Haddock case New York was the matrimonial domicile of the husband and
wife. The husband abandoned his wife without cause, became a domiciliary of
Connecticut, and there obtained a divorce. The question presented was
whether New York was required, under the full faith and credit clause, to
5. 283 N.Y. 146, 27 N.E.2d 969 (1940).
6. The court relied on Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N.Y. 382, 165 N.E. 819 (1929), In
which it was held that a wife was not entitled to an injunction to prevent a woman from
using the surname of her husband where her husband had obtained a void Mexican
divorce, and, on the strength thereof, had married the woman against whom the injunction
was prayed.
7. "[I]t would seem that the majority of the court took a point of view which
is opposed to essential considerations of natural justice, particularly within the domain
of equity. It is universally conceded that a court of equity may issue an injunction in order
to prevent oppression, fraud, embarrassment and the like." Wormser, Injunction Against
Prosecution of Divorce Actions in Other States, 9 Fordham L. Rev. 376, 378 (1940).
"Both as a matter of sound equity jurisprudence and of enlightened public policy, It would
appear that the courts of this State are not without power to exercise their sound dis-
cretion in order to enjoin the commission of what everyone must admit to be wrong."
Id. at 379.
8. 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
9. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
[Vol. 26
recognize the Connecticut decree, when the wife, who remained in New York,
was not personally served and did not appear in the Connecticut proceeding.
The United States Supreme Court concluded that the divorce, though valid in
Connecticut, could be refused recognition in New York. The divorce decree
of the Connecticut court was, therefore, not entitled to full faith and credit.
Thus it was possible to have a spouse married in one jurisdiction, but not in
another. It was this complexity which the courts before the Goldstein case
sought to obviate by way of injunctive relief.
In 1942 the Supreme Court expressly overruled the Haddock case in the
first of the Williams v. Nortk Carolina cases.10 There it was recognized that a
divorce granted by one state must be granted recognition by all states if either
party was a domiciliary of the granting state. The second Williams case"x
added that the finding of domicile by the granting state would not be conclu-
sive but could be successfully attacked in a sister state. The finding of domicile
by the foreign court, however, raises a presumption in the attacking state which
might be difficult to rebut. As Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority,
emphasized: "The burden of undermining the verity which the . . . decrees
import rests heavily upon the assailant."'12
The Williams case, in overruling the Haddock case, negatived the major
premise upon which the Goldstein decision was predicated, namely, that the
party seeking the injunction had nothing to fear in New York because New
York would not recognize the foreign divorce. Now that the foreign court's
finding of domicile was prima facie valid, could the reasoning of the Goldstein
case be any longer logically employed? Lower courts expressed doubt as to
whether the Goldstein decision was still valid precedent and, therefore, granted
injunctions. 13
In 1951 the New York Court of Appeals in Gar'in v. Garvin'- unanimously
approved these lower court holdings, indicating that the Goldstein case was
no longer controlling, at least as to decrees involving the full faith and credit
doctrine. In the Garvin case a wife instituted an action for separation in New
York in which the husband made an appearance. During the pendency of the
separation suit the husband went to the Virgin Islands where he instituted
divorce proceedings. The wife then moved to enjoin him from proceeding with
the divorce, alleging that the husband's residence in the Virgin Islands was a
sham. The court granted an injunction pendente lite. It was held that the
10. 317 U.S. 2S7 (1942).
11. 325 U.S. 226 (1945). See also Cook v. Cook, 342 US. 126 (1951).
12. 325 U.S. at 233-34.
13. Pereira v. Pereira, 272 App. Div. 231, 70 N.Y.S.2d 763 (Ist Dcp't 1947); Sullivan
v. Sullivan, 271 App. Div. 1016, 68 N.Y.S.2d 394 (2d Dep't 1947); Palmer v. Palmer, 26S
App. Div. 1010, 52 N.YS.2d 3M3 (3d Dep't 1944); Allan v. Allan, 63 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup.
Ct. 1946); Maloney v. Maloney, 51 N.Y.S.2d 4 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Ciacco v. Ciacco, S0
N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. 1944). "Unquestionably some doubt has been cast upon the decision
in Goldstein v. Goldstein ... by the United States Supreme Court. That doubt can only
be determined by a decision of our Court of Appeals.. . 2' Adams v. Adams, iso Mic.
578, 579, 42 N.Y.S.2d 266, 267 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
14. 302 N.Y. 96, 96 .E.?2d 721 (1951).
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Goldstein case was not controlling because under the Williams doctrine full
faith and credit must be given to the judgments of courts of United States
territories and possessions as well as to those of the several states.10 Therefore,
the wife should be spared the heavy burden of striking down the prima
facie effect of the foreign court's finding of domicile. The decision in effect
reasserted the right of a court of equity to restrain a spouse who seeks
fraudulently to obtain a divorce in a sister state, but without suggesting that
the ex parte action would violate some legal right of the innocent spouse. The
court apparently felt that the increased burden of proof constituted sufficient
injury to the wife.
In brief, under the Garvin rule, New York will enjoin a defendant from
obtaining a foreign divorce decree if such decree would be entitled to full faith
and credit even though, under the facts of the case, it could ultimately be
avoided on jurisdictional grounds.16
FOREIGN COUNTRY DIVORCES
What effect, if any, has the Williams case had on the Goldstein decision in
the area of foreign country, ex parte divorce actions, which are beyond the
protection of the full faith and credit clause? Lower courts favored the propo-
sition that the Goldstein case was still controlling because foreign country
divorces are not entitled to prima facie validity. 17 This view was approved
in 1955 by the Court of Appeals in Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum.18 In that case
15. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (1950); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170 (1938); Davis v.
Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938); Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1934).
16. Before a New York court will grant such an injunction it must be shown that:
(a) New York has in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. Robinson v. Robinson,
254 App. Div. 696, 3 N.Y.S.2d 882 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 279 N.Y. 582, 17 N.E.2d 448 (1938);
Evans v. Evans, 273 App. Div. 895, 77 N.Y.S.2d 320 (2d Dep't 1948). (b) The foreign
divorce action is pending or some affirmative steps have been taken. Boston v. Boston,
205 Misc. 561, 129 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1954). The divorce decrees must not yet
have been granted. Philipson v. Philipson, 191 Misc. 913, 80 N.Y.S.2d 581 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
(c) The defendant does not have a bona fide domicile in the foreign jurisdiction and he
is, specifically, a resident of New York. Sivakoff v. Sivakoff, 280 App. Div. 106, 111
N.Y.S.2d 864 (1st Dep't 1952); McDonald v. McDonald, 182 Misc. 1006, 52 N.Y.S.2d 385
(Sup. Ct. 1944). But this requisite is not necessary where a temporary injunction pendente
lite is sought as an incident to a matrimonial action, and where it appears that the foreign
decree would render the judgment in the main action ineffective. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
§ 878(1). However, if the spouse seeking the temporary injunction pendente lite Is the
defendant in the main action, then the plaintiff may be enjoined only if the defendant
counterclaims in the main action and could obtain judgment on the counterclaim. Eddel
v. Eddel, 284 App. Div. 758, 134 N.Y.S.2d 758 (4th Dep't 1954); Bedient v. Bedtent, 190
Misc. 480, 74 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct. 1947). (d) The foreign action would subject the
complainant spouse to inconvenience and would endanger the marital status of the com-
plainant. Pereira v. Pereira, 272 App. Div. 281, 70 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1st Dep't 1947).
17. Fromer v. Fromer, 138 N.Y.S.2d 883 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Sanguinettl v. Sangulnetti,
138 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Borax v. Borax, 136 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Sup. Ct. 1952);
Winikoff v. Winikoff, 136 N.Y.S.2d 161 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
18. 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955). Special term dismissed the complaint In
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the plaintiff-wife alleged that both parties were residents of New York; that
the husband, after she had obtained a New York separation, went to Mexico,
instituted an action for divorce and remained there twenty-four hours; and that
she was not personally served in Mexico. The allegations of the complaint
were not denied. The court held that the motion to dismiss the complaint was
properly granted since there was no threatened injury to the wife's marital
status or property rights that could not be avoided by means of a declaratory
judgment. The court said that the Mexican divorce decree, secured without
a bona fide domicile, would be utterly void, and would not carry prima fade
validity, even though it may have included on its face a recitation of duly-
attained jurisdiction. The court expressly reaffirmed the Goldstein case as
precedent insofar as injunctions against foreign country divorces were con-
cerned.
The language of the court lends itself to two possible interpretations: first,
an injunction will not lie against any foreign country divorce; or, second, an
injunction will not lie when the defendant is seeking an admittedly invalid
foreign country divorce decree. The latter interpretation is supported by the
following language of the court: ".. . the question as to whether an injunction
may issue to restrain defendant from prosecuting this Mexican divorce action
-a clear legal nullity under the allegations . .. and of no more validity than
a so-called mail-order divorce . . . is controlled by valid precedent . .. *3
If this interpretation is correct, it would follow that injunctions against other
types of foreign country ex parte divorces, those with some color of juris-
diction, are not necessarily barred by the Roscnbaum case. The question of
whether injunctive relief would lie against this type of divorce action would
seem to be left open, since the resultant decrees would not be granted full
faith and credit, but could be recognized on grounds of comity.-
However, the court also employed language which supports the conclusion
that an injunction will not lie against any foreign country ex parle divorce.
The court distinguished between the state divorces and their prima facie
136 N.Y.S2d 734 (Sup. CL 1954), the appellate division reverzed in a 3 to 2 decision,
285 App. Div. 427, 138 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1st Dep't 1955), and the Court of Appmals by a 4
to 3 vote reversed the appellate division and reinstated the special term d-mical. It is
interesting to note that out of 13 judges who considered the case, 7 were of the viev that
the Goldstein case should be followed while 6 thought that the Goldstein decision was not
good law.
19. 309 N.Y. at 376, 130 N.E.2d at 904. "The rationale of Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum
. . . is that an injunction against foreign proceedings will be granted if the foreign
judgment would be more than 'a complete nullity' ... ." Aghnides v. Aghnides, - Misc.
2d -, -, 159 N.YS.2d 343, 350 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (dictum).
20. "[A] decree confirming or dissolving a marriage, is recognized as valid in every
country, unless contrary to the policy of its own law." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 US. 113,
167 (1895); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948). Where the action
for divorce has been instituted by "mail order" through a power of attorney granted to
a lawyer in Mexico, the decree has been held null and void upon the ground that the
court did not have the slightest semblance of jurisdiction. Querze v. Querze, 290 N.Y.
13, 47 N.E.2d 423 (1943); Vose v. Vose, 2S0 N.Y. 779, 21 N.E2d 616 (1939).
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validity on one side, and the foreign country divorces which are not entitled
to prima facie validity on the other.2 1 The court's language indicated that it
did not have in mind the varying degrees of proof which may be required be-
tween decrees of various foreign countries, but rather it would appear that the
court distinguished only the burden of proof necessary to invalidate a sister-
state decree as opposed to any foreign country decree. The court cited the
Garvin case to point up this difference. This interpretation of the Rosenbaum
case is further strengthened by the fact that the court, in refusing the injunc-
tion, referred to the availability of a remedy at law, a declaratory judgment.22
That remedy, although also available, is not referred to in sister-state divorce
decree situations 2 3
CRITICISM OF THE ROSENBAUM CASE
No matter which interpretation of the Rosenbaum opinion is correct, the
decision has basic difficulties.
Liberal Interpretation
If the case is taken to mean that an injunction should not issue against any
foreign country divorce on the ground that foreign country ex parte divorce
decrees are not entitled to prima facie validity, the weakness of the court's
reasoning lies in using the Goldstein case as a still valid precedent. The Gold-
stein rule was the law when Haddock was the law. Under the Haddock rule
the New York courts were not compelled to and did not as a matter of policy
recognize an ex parte divorce decree.2 4 The Williams case, however, over-
ruled the Haddock case and ignored fault as a relevant element affecting the
right of the offending spouse to acquire a foreign domicile. 2 Today, therefore,
a migratory spouse, regardless of fault, who becomes a domiciliary of a
foreign jurisdiction confers on the foreign court power to grant a valid ex parte
divorce. A state's policy is subordinated to and is bound by the sister-state
decree.26 The state's policy is not similarly subordinated in the case of foreign
21. "Judgments of courts of foreign countries . . . 'differ from judgments of courts of
our sister States to which . . . full faith and credit must be given. . . .'" 309 N.Y. at 375,
130 N.E.2d at 903. "There is thus no . . . basis for treating sister State and foreign
country divorce judgments as identical. . . . defendant is attempting to prosecute a
divorce which would not be entitled to 'full faith and credit' in this State ... " Id. at
376, 130 N.E.2d at 904.
22. "A simple action for declaratory judgment . . . is at all times available. . . . Since
plaintiff thus has an adequate remedy . . . equity should refrain from granting the
drastic relief of injunction." 309 N.Y. at 377, 130 N.E.2d at 904.
23. See Garvin v. Garvin, 302 N.Y. 96, 96 N.E.2d 721 (1951).
24. See Howe, The Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees in Now York State, 40
Colum. L. Rev. 373 (1940).
25. Pereira v. Pereira, 272 App. Div. 281, 70 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1st Dep't 1947); Howard
v. Howard, 187 Misc. 16, 63 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
26. "[Wlhen a court of one state acting in accord with the requirements of procedural
due process alters the marital status of one domiciled in that state by granting him a
divorce from his absent spouse, we cannot say its decree should be excepted from the
full faith and credit clause merely because its enforcement or recognition in another state
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country divorces. New York has, however, changed its policy and will recog-
nize a foreign country ex parte divorce decree when one party has established
valid domicile there, whereas previously, under the Haddock rule, it would not
recognize such decrees.27 Therefore, does not present New York law impose,
if not exactly the same, almost the same burden of proof on the party attack-
ing it?28 To apply, then, a different norm in determining the propriety of
equitable relief is logically inconsistent. Except for the prima facie validity,
the situation is identical with that of the sister state. It is difficult to under-
stand why a nominal difference in the proof necessary to show lack of domicile
should be decisive on the question of whether or not to grant an injunction,
if the plaintiff in fact sustains that burden and establishes the defendant's lack
of domicile in the foreign country.
The refusal to grant equitable relief and the assignment of a difference in
the burden of proof as the reason for such refusal is based on purely technical
considerations. Should not a court of equity be guided by the equitable merits,
such as were considered by the courts prior to the Goldstein decision? - A
state's refusal to aid its own citizen where he or she proves that the defendant's
domicile in the foreign country is a sham, is a solution that requires that actual
harm must first occur. This solution aids no one since the defendant is free
to entangle himself in further marital difficulties, and the plaintiff must wait
until the other spouse procures the void decree in order to show that the decree
is based on shame domicile. Without doubt the determination in advance of the
lack of bona fide domicile and the granting of injunctive relief would in most
cases forestall the necessity of subsequent litigation.
Strict Interpretatiom
The Rosenbaum decision would appear weak even if restricted to its facts,
that is, that an injunction will not lie when the plaintiff is seeking a Mexican
would conflict with the policy of the latter.' Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,
303 (1942).
27. "Neither our statutes nor our judicial decisions bar recognition of a foreign decree
of divorce where the foreign court was competent to act by reason of it having acquired
jurisdiction under its laws.... No reason appears for the public policy of our State to
differently regard the resort of the parties to a foreign country." In the Matter of
Fleischer, 192 Misc. 777, 781-32, SO N.Y.S.2d 543, 547 (Surr. Ct. 194S). "With the ex-
ception of such right to examine into the bona fides of the foreign residence ... Williams
v. North Carolina .. . settled the other issues. . . .Within the limitations referred to
above, the validity of decrees of the foreign country in question, as distinguished from
those of a sister state which are given full faith and credit, ... are accepted in our courts
as a matter of comity." Caswell v. Caswell, 111 N.Y.S.2d 875, 876 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
28. Judgment obtained in a foreign country is conclusive, so far as to preclude a re-
trial upon the merits. It is not conclusive, however, and it can be impeached by proof
that the court had no jurisdiction. Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N.Y. 146 (1862). "The grounds,
then, for overturning a foreign country judgment are the same as those for overturnin;
the judgment of a sister State. . . . [T]he burden of proving lack of jurisdiction, is on
the plaintiff. . . .' Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. at 3S0-81, 130 N.E2d at 907
(1955) (dissenting opinion).
29. See note 3 supra.
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ex parte divorce which is admittedly a legal nullity. The reason for the refusal
to grant an injunction against the procurement of such a divorce is based on
the grounds that "no rights of any kind" could result from such decree and
that, therefore, no harm can be done to the plaintiff-wife. Such view is not in
accord with the development of the law in the matrimonial field. Since the
decision of Krause v. Krause,80 for example, a husband who in reliance on a
void foreign country decree has remarried and has returned with his second
"wife" to New York, would, in an action for separation and support by her, be
estopped from denying that she is his legal wife. He may be compelled to
support two wives, a result which might well diminish the property rights of
the first wife, since the court would be forced to consider the new demands
on the husband's resources. This was the plausible argument offered by Chief
Judge Conway in his dissent in the Goldstein case.3'
Firthermore, under a statutory provision, the second "wife" can be awarded
alimony against her "husband" even in an action to annul the second mar-
riage. 32 Notwithstanding that such a Mexican ex parte decree is void in New
York, it is valid in Mexico, and thus alters the marital status in that juris-
diction. If the husband remarries, the marriage will be valid, at least in
Mexico.33 Once such a situation develops, it is the breeding ground for further
litigation between the husband and his first wife, and frequently results in
litigation between the two wives after the death of the husband.
84
30. 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E.2d 290 (1940), where it was held that the husband must
support his second "wife." He was precluded from denying the validity of his admittedly
void divorce from his first wife since he was the one who procured it. Although the case
involved a divorce obtained in a sister state, its reasoning appears to extend to divorces
granted in foreign countries as well. For an interesting application of the doctrine of this
case, see Ridder v. Ridder, 175 Misc. 84, 22 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
31. 283 N.Y. at 149-56, 27 N.E.2d at 970-73 (1940) (dissenting opinion).
32. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1140-a provides: "When an action is brought to annul a
marriage or to declare the nullity of a void marriage, the court may give such direction
for support of the wife by the husband as justice requires. . . . This section shall apply
to any action brought by either the husband or the wife. . . ." In Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308
N.Y. 218, 225, 124 N.E.2d 290, 294-95 (1954), the court said: "By writing section 1140-a
into the law, the legislature has chosen, without regard to whether the marriage is void
or voidable, to attach to annulled marriages sufficient validity and significance to support an
award of alimony, in other words, to serve, the same as any valid marriage would, as the
foundation of a continuing duty to support the wife after the marriage is terminated."
Necessarily, the statute also covers void marriages contracted after obtaining a Mexican
"mail-order" divorce decree. Brown v. Brown, 282 App. Div. 726, 122 N.Y.S.2d 411 (2d
Dep't 1953); Payne v. Payne, 205 Misc. 802, 129 N.Y.S.2d 769 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
33. Alfaro v. Alfaro, 142 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865 (Sup. Ct. 1955); cf. Johnson v. Johnson,
f46 Misc. 93, 261 N.Y. Supp. 523 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
34. See 40 Colum. L. Rev. 1255 (1940). See also Imbrioscia v. Quayle, 197 Misc.
1049, 96 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Sup. Ct. 1950), rev'd, 278 App. Div. 144, 103 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1st
Dep't 1951), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 841, 104 N.E.2d 378 (1952); In the Matter of Vogel, 251
App. Div. 741, 295 N.Y. Supp. 913 (2d Dep't 1937); In the Matter of Green, 155 Misc.
641, 280 N.Y. Supp. 692 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd, 246 App. Div. 583, 284 N.Y. Supp. 370 (1st
Dep't 1935); In the Matter of Sitkin, 151 Misc. 448, 271 N.Y. Supp. 688 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
COMMENTS
Furthermore, it is specious reasoning to refuse to enjoin the procuring of a
void Mexican ex parte decree on the grounds that the innocent spouse has an
adequate remedy at law in the form of a declaratory judgment. A declaratory
judgment in a divorce case is not an adequate remedy. It cannot, for example,
restore the plaintiff to her previous social position. Mlore importantly, it cannot
divest all the rights vested in others who acted in reliance on the divorce
decree.3 5 At any rate such remedy is equally available in the sister-state situa-
tion. Yet injunctions are granted and a declaratory judgment is apparently
not regarded, and properly so, as an adequate remedy sufficient to deny equi-
table relief. The weakness in ascribing this remedy as a reason for the refusal
to grant an injunction against Mexican divorces is implied in the court's failure
even to suggest its applicability in the case of a sister-state divorce and their
hesitancy to assign any reason for the distinction between the two.
It is clear that a MAexican divorce decree, even if an absolute legal nullity
in New York, still constitutes a clear threat to the resident wife's property
rights, and creates a situation in which a court of equity should protect citizens
who seek its aid.
CONCLUSION
New York recognizes foreign ex parte divorces, both of sister states and
foreign countries, if the party establishes domicile in the granting jurisdiction.
Since the courts readily grant injunctive relief against sister-state divorces,
there is no reason why the courts should not do the same in foreign country
situations. In considering an injunction against foreign country cx parle di-
vorces based on sham domicile, in light of the present law, the test of whether
or not the plaintiff will be harmed should not be the degree of the invalidity of
the decree, or the difference, if any, of the burden of proof necessary to show
lack of jurisdiction in the foreign court, or whether a declaratory judgment
is available. The test should be the actual likelihood of the innocent spouse
being harmed by the invalid divorce decree, determined not by impersonal
legalistic factors but rather by those traditional equitable considerations which
the courts freely applied prior to the Goldstein decision.30 An invalid foreign
country divorce decree is almost invariably a threat to the innocent spouse's
property interests. Hence equity should not hesitate, upon application, to act
and to prevent such an invalid divorce decree from coming into existence.
35. See notes 3, 31 supra.
36. See note 3 supra.
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